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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2009

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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USMISSIONGENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNRM SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSSACLANT

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

CINCUSAFA

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2924

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: MPOL, NATO,DPC

QSUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING MAY 23,1975: AGENDA ITEM XII,
MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE

AT CLOSE OF DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING MAY 23 MINISTERS APPROVED
FOLLOWING FINAL COMMUNIQUE AND ATTACHED ABBREVIATED VERSION OF
MINISTERIAL GGIDANCE 1975.

BEGIN TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE:

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

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1. IN THE COURSE OF A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC
SITUATION AND THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST,
MINISTERS WERE BRIEFED ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GROWTH
OF THE MILITARY POWER OF THE WARSAW PACT. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND

OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION, THEY REVIEWED THE PRESENT STATE OF NATO'S DEFENCES; THEY EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN THE IMPORTANT FIELDS OF RATIONALISATION OF FUNCTIONS AND STANDARISATION OF EQUIPMENT AND GAVE DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK IN THESE AREAS. THEY ALSO CONSIDERED THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF MBFR CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS IN VIENNA.

2. THEY DEVOTED SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CURRENT STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, SOVIET MILITARY AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE SITUATION IN ADJOINING REGIONS.

3. MINISTERS HEARD WITH INTEREST A STATEMENT BY MR. ROY MASON, THIS YEAR'S CHAIRMAN OF THE EUROGROUP MINISTERS., ON CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN THE EUROGROUP, AND AGREED TO PURSUE WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE MACHINERY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TWO-WAY STREET BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA IN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE A MORE COST EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES AND INCREASE STANDARDISATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS.

4. AMONG THE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE THE IMPROVEMENT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE AND THE FINANCING OF THE COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME UP TO 1979. MINISTERS ALSO ENDORSED A PROPOSED JOINT STUDY OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF ACQUIRING AND OPERATING AN AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM ON A CO-OPERATIVE BASIS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S AIR DEFENCES.

5. THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INFORMED HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON THE USE BY THE US FORCES OF MILITARY FACILITIES IN SPAIN, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN OUTSIDE UNCLASSIFIED

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THE NATO CONTEXT.

6. FINALLY MINISTERS LAID DOWN GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE PLANNING IN NATO. THESE GUIDELINES RESTATE THE BASIC AIMS AND STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE AND PLACE SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE ADOPTION OF A LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT. THEY ALSO PROVIDE A FRESH STIMULUS TO THE OPTIMUM USE OF RESOURCES THROUGH RATIONALISATION, STANDARDISATION AND GREATER CO-OPERATIVE EFFORTS. THIS MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE WILL PROVIDE A DIRECTIVE AND REFERENCE POINT FOR ALL DEFENCE PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN NATO UP TO 1982 AND BEYOND. AN ABBREVIATED VERSION IS ATTACHED.

END TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

BEGIN TEXT OF ABBREVIATED VERSION OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975:

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975

INTRODUCTION

1. NATO PROCEDURES CALL FOR MINISTERS TO GIVE GUIDANCE FOR DEFENCE PLANNING EVERY TWO YEARS. THE GUIDANCE REFLECTS THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS WHICH COULD AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO FORCES DURING THE NEXT PLANNING PERIOD. THE GUIDANCE, BEING A MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENT ENDORSED BY MINISTERS, PROVIDES A REFERENCE POINT AND DIRECTIVE FOR ALL DEFENCE PLANNING ACTIVITIES, AT BOTH THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, IN NATO.

LONG RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT

2. PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE HAVE COVERED THE SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD OF THE NATO DEFENCE PLANNING CYCLE. HOWEVER, LENGTHENED TIMESCALES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS TOGETHER WITH INCREASED COSTS OF MILITARY MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT NOW MAKE IT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A MORE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENCE PLANNING. TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE FACTORS A LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT HAS BEEN ADOPTED, WHICH PLACES INCREASED EMPHASIS ON ESTABLISHMENT OF RIGOROUS PRIORITIES.

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3. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION AND TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE UNDERLINE THE INEVITABLE NECESSITY FOR NATO TO MAINTAIN A CAPABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION OR THE THREAT OF IT, AND IF DETERRENCE FAILS, TO RESTORE AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. THE MEMBERS OF NATO ARE SEEKING IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS WITH THE EAST AND THE REDUCTION OF FORCES ON A MUTUAL AND BALANCED BASIS, BUT NEGOTIATIONS ARE SLOW. MEANWHILE THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS CONTINUE TO EXPAND. CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF NATO'S DEFENSIVE STRENGTH WILL FURNISH A SECURE BASIS FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING A BARRIER TO AGGRESSION OR THREATS OF AGGRESSION.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 5317

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEIDATE

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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4. THE LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT SUPPORTS AGREED NATO STRATEGY BY CALLING FOR A BALANCED FORCE STRUCTURE OF INTER-DEPENDENT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, THEATRE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABILITIES. EACH ELEMENT OF THIS TRIAD PERFORMS A UNIQUE ROLE; IN COMBINATION THEY PROVIDE MUTUAL SUPPORT AND REINFORCEMENT. NO SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE TRIAD CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR ANOTHER. THE CONCEPT ALSO CALLS FOR THE MODERNISATION OF BOTH STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES; HOWEVER, MAJOR EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. NATO HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED A LARGE MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN THIS REGARD. NATO HAS FIELDLED THE BASIC INGREDIENTS FOR A STALWART CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. HOWEVER, UNCLASSIFIED

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DISPARITIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES REMAIN. THE ALLIES MUST REDUCE THESE DISPARITIES AND PROVIDE A STABLE, LONG-TERM BASIS FOR ATTAINING AND MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CONENTIONAL FORCE .

5. THE ESSENCE OF THE LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT IS THAT NATO CAN PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE IF THE ALLIES MAINTAIN THE FORCES ALREADY IN EXISTENCE (OR FORESEEN IN PLANS CURRENTLY DECLARED TO NATO) AND CONTINUE TO MODERNISE AND IMPROVE THESE FORCES AND THEIR SUPPORTING FACILITIES. THIS WILL REQUIRE SOME MODEST ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES; THE ACTUAL INCREASE FOR EACH COUNTRY WILL VARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CURRENT FORCE CONTRIBUTION, ITS PRESENT EFFORTS AND ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH.

IT ALSO REQUIRES THE OPTIMUM USE OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR DEFENCE THROUGH THE RIGOROUS SETTING OF PRIORITIES AND A GREATER DEGREE OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL FORCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

6. THIS LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT WILL HELP TO PROVIDE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE BASIS FOR NATO PLANNING WITH BOTH THE FLEXIBILITY TO ABSORB EFFECTS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES, AND WITH THE STABILITY IN NATIONAL DEFENCE PROGRAMMES TO PREVENT SUDDEN AND UNECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS.

7. THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGED THE SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON SEVERAL ISSUES OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY, E.G. ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS (SALT) AND ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. BUT ALTHOUGH THE ATMOSPHERE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS IMPROVED OVER THE LAST DECADE, IT REMAINS A FACT THAT THE WARSAW PACT CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY CAPABILITY MUCH GREATER THAN THE NEEDED FOR SELF-DEFENCE. IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FIELD THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING ALREADY ATTAINED ROUGH PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, NOW SEEMS TO BE SEEKING TO ATTAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE SPHISTICATED AND POWERFUL MISSILES. IMPROVEMENTS ARE ALSO BEING MADE IN THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF AIRCRAFT, TANKS, ARTILLERY AND MISSILES. AT SEA THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET MARITIME FORCES OVER THE PAST DECADE AND THEIR WORLD-WIDE DEPLOYMENT HAVE ADDED A NEW DIMENSION

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TO THEIR CAPABILITIES WHICH ARE NOW SUCH THAT, INDEPENDENTLY OF A LAND/AIR ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY, SOVIET MARITIME FORCES COULD BE USED AGAINST NATO FORCES AT SEA OR AGAINST OUR MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN ORDER TO INTERFERE WITH THE ECONOMIES AND VITAL SUPPLIES OF NATO NATIONS.

8. THE BASIS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY IS THAT THE COMMON DEFENCE OF THE ALLIANCE IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE. THE ALLIES WOULD CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON ONE OR MORE OF THEM AS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL. THE ESSENTIAL SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE DEPENDS UPON THE POLITICAL RESOLVE OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONS AND THE SCALE OF EFFORT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEVOTE TO THE COMMON DEFENCE. SHOULD WEAKNESSES IN EITHER CAUSE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO DOUBT OUR READINESS TO WITHSTAND POLITICAL PRESSURE OR OUR DETERMINATION TO DEFEND OURSELVES BY ALL THE MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL AGAINST AGGRESSION, THEY MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD USE THEIR MILITARY POWER AGAINST US FOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY ENDS WITHOUT UNDUE RISK; ACCORDINGLY THE DEFENCE POSTURE OF NATO SHOULD BE SO CONSTRUCTED AS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DEPLOYMENT, CAPABILITIES AND POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES.

9. THE AIM OF NATO'S STRATEGY AND MILITARY PLANNING IS

TO ENSURE SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE. THE PRIMARY AIM IS TO
DETER AN ATTACK BEFORE IT IS LAUNCHED, BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO
ANY AGGRESSOR THAT ANY ATTACK ON NATO WOULD BE MET BY A STRONG
DEFENCE AND MIGHT INITIATE A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH CANNOT
BE CALCULATED IN ADVANCE, INVOLVING RISKS TO THE AGGRESSOR OUT
OF ALL PROPORTION TO ANY ADVANTAGES HE MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN. IN
AN ERA OF BROAD STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY DETERRENCE TO ALL
FORMS OF AGGRESSION CANNOT BE BASED UPON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
ALONE; IT MUST BE PROVIDED BY THE OVERALL CAPABILITIES OF ALL
NATO FORCES. THE ALLIANCE MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN AN
APPROPRIATE MANNER TO AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND; THE RESPONSE MUST
BE EFFECTIVE IN RELATION TO THE LEVEL OF FORCE USED BY THE
AGGRESSOR AND MUST AT THE SAME TIME MAKE HIM RECOGNISE THE
DANGERS OF ESCALATION TO A HIGHER LEVEL.

10. SHOULD AGGRESSION OCCUR, THE MILITARY AIM IS TO
PRESERVE OR RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE NATO
AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE
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CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENCE AND FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE. NATO
FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ANY CAPABILITIES AT THEIR
DISPOSAL (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) FOR THIS PURPOSE. THIS
DETERMINATION MUST BE EVIDENT TO THE AGGRESSOR.

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USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
RUDORRAX USNMR SHAPE
USCICNEUR
USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
INCUSAFE

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NATO FORCES

11. IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE NATO NEEDS CONVENTIONAL LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES, A CAPABILITY FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THESE ELEMENTS OF NATO FORCES SHOULD EACH POSSESS A CREDIBILITY OF THEIR OWN, AND SHOULD COMBINE TO PRODUCE AN INTERLOCKING SYSTEM OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE. SPECIFICALLY:

(A) THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO RESIST AND REPEL A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ON A LIMITED SCALE, AND TO DETER LARGER SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS

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THROUGH THE PROSPECT OF AN EXPANSION OF THE AREA, SCALE AND INTENSITY OF HOSTILITIES WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NEVERTHELESS, SHOULD LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION OCCUR, THESE FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IN THE FORWARD AREAS SUFFICIENT TO INFILTRATE SERIOUS LOSSES ON THE AGGRESSOR AND CONVINCE HIM OF THE RISKS OF CONTINUING HIS AGGRESSION;

(B) THE PURPOSE OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSIVE EFFECT OF NATO'S FORCES AGAINST LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, AND TO PROVIDE A DETERRENT AGAINST THE EXPANSION OF LIMITED CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AND THE POSSIBLE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE AGGRESSOR. ITS AIM IS TO CONVINCE THE AGGRESSOR THAT ANY FORM OF ATTACK ON NATO COULD RESULT IN VERY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO HIS OWN FORCES, AND TO EMPHASISE THE DANGERS IMPLICIT IN THE CONTINUANCE OF A CONFLICT BY PRESENTING HIM WITH THE RISK THAT SUCH A SITUATION COULD ESCALATE BEYOND HIS CONTROL UP TO AN ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR. CONVERSELY, THIS CAPABILITY SHOULD BE OF SUCH A NATURE THAT CONTROL OF THE SITUATION WOULD REMAIN IN NATO HANDS:

(C) IT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO STRENGTHEN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OPTIONS, TO PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY OF EXTENDING DETERRENCE ACROSS A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES, AND TO PROVIDE AN ULTIMATE SANCTION FOR THE OVERALL STRATEGY.

THESE PRINCIPLES OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE APPLY TO AGGRESSION
AT SEA AS WELL AS ON LAND.

RESOURCES

1. UNTIL THERE IS A DOWNWARD TREND IN WARSAW PACT FORCE
LEVELS, POSSIBLE AS A RESULT OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, NATO'S
PRESENT FORCE CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS THE WARSAW PACT WILL AT
LEAST HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED. THIS IMPLIES THE MAINTENANCE OF
THE LEVELS OF FORCES ALREADY IN EXISTENCE (OR FORESEEN IN PLANS
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CURRENTLY DECLARED TO NATO) AND THE REGULAR REPLACEMENT AND
MODERNISATION OF MAJOR EQUIPMENTS. THIS IS THE BASIC PRINCIPLE
WHICH SHOULD DETERMINE THE ANNUAL AND LONG-TERM ALLOCATION OF
RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES IN ALL COUNTRIES. DEFENCE BUDGETS
SHOULD THEREFORE COMPENSATE IN FULL FOR NECESSARY OR UNAVOID-
ABLE INCREASES IN OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE COSTS, INCLUDING COSTS OF
PERSONNEL, E.G. THOSE CAUSED BY INFLATION; MOREOVER, IN MOST
COUNTRIES THE PROPORTION OF EXPENDITURE DEVOTED TO THE PROVISION
OF MAJOR NEW EQUIPMENT NEEDS TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

13. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE
THAT EACH MEMBER NATION SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE MAKING A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON DEFENCE WHICH IS COMMENSURATE WITH
THE ROLE IT HAS ASSUMED IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALLIANCE AND
ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH.

ALLIANCE CO-OPERATION

14. NATO DEFENCE PROGRAMMES ARE ORGANIZED FOR THE MOST
PART ON A STRICTLY NATIONAL BASIS. THE EXISTENCE OF SOVEREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF FINANCE ARE BOUND TO PLACE
LIMITS ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH INTEGRATION OF COMMON PROGRAMMES
CAN BE ACHIEVED; NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES
FOR CO-OPERATIVE EFFORT WHERE A MORE ACTIVE APPROACH IS NOW
URGENTLY REQUIRED. E.G.:

(A) RATIONALISATION. THIS MEANS THE ADJUSTMENT OF
TASKS AND FUNCTIONS BOTH WITHIN NATIONAL FORCES
STRUCTURES AND AS BETWEEN NATIONS; SUCH AS ADJUSTMENTS
MUST NOT INVOLVE ANY DIMINUTION OF THE OVERALL
CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES OR ANY REDUCTION IN
NATIONAL DEFENCE EFFORTS.

(B) FLEXIBILITY. THIS REQUIRES THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
OBSTACLES TO THE OPTIMUM EMPLOYMENT OF ALL FORCES
AVAILABLE.

(C) STANDARDISATION. THE STANDARDIZATION (OR INTER-
OPERABILITY) OF EQUIPMENT MAKES IT EASIER FOR FORCES
OF DIFFERENT NATIONS TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER.

IT SIMPLIFIES TRAINING AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

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(D) CO-OPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS A PARTICULAR FORM OF STANDARDISATION WHICH CAN EXPLOIT THE BENEFITS OF SCALE AND REDUCE UNIT COSTS. CO-OPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THIS FIELD SHOULD BECOME A TWO-WAY STREET.

15. THE FULLEST USE SHOULD BE MADE OF EXISTING CIVIL ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY PLANS. DETAILED PLANNING IS ALSO NEEDED IN THE CIVIL SECTOR TO PREPARE FOR A RAPID TRANSITION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES TO AN EMERGENCY FOOTING.

GUIDANCE

16. IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, MINISTERS ESTABLISHED GUIDANCE ON THE LEVELS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES, THE SCALE OF RESOURCES, THE NATURE OF THE CO-OPERATIVE EFFORTS, AND THE CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES TO BE USED IN ALL DEFENCE PLANNING IN NATO BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, FOR THE FUTURE.

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CINCUSNAVEUR
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